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Abstract
Based on the instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation (INQC), Buhrman et al. proposed an
excellent attack strategy to quantum position verification (QPV) protocols in 2011, and showed that,
if the colluding adversaries are allowed to previously share unlimited entangled states, it is impossible
to design an unconditionally secure QPV protocol in the previous model. Here, trying to overcome
this no-go theorem, we find some assumptions in the INQC attack, which are implicit but essential for
the success of this attack, and present three different QPV protocols where these assumptions are not
satisfied. We show that for the general adversaries, who execute the attack operations at every common
time slot or the time when they detect the arrival of the challenge signals from the verifiers, secure QPV
is achievable. This implies practically secure QPV can be obtained even if the adversaries is allowed to
share unlimited entanglement previously. Here by “practically” we mean that in a successful attack the
adversaries need launch a new round of attack on the coming qubits with extremely high frequency so
that none of the possible qubits, which may be sent at random time, will be missed. On the other side,
using such Superdense INQC (SINQC) attack, the adversaries can still attack the proposed protocols
successfully in theory. The particular attack strategies to our protocols are presented respectively. On
this basis, we demonstrate the impossibility of secure QPV with looser assumptions, i.e. the enhanced
no-go theorem for QPV.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum position verification, position-based cryptography
1 Introductions
1.1 Background
As an interesting branch of cryptography, position-based cryptography (PBC) [1] adds an additional layer
of security in the sense that the geographical position of a party is used as its credential. That is, it guarantee
that only the users in an intended geographical position can achieve the current cryptographic goals. PBC
might have potential applications in military communications and our daily life.
Position verification (PV) is one of the important applications of PBC. It allows a prover to prove to a set
of cooperating verifiers, who are spatially separated, that he/she is at a particular spatial location. Because
of its great usefulness in some interesting applications, PV has drawn a lot of attention and quite a few
∗gaofei bupt@hotmail.com
—–
V0 V1E0 E1P
Figure 1: One-dimension QPV and the INQC attack. The shaded area is the finite secure region around P .
schemes were proposed for that (see Ref. [1] for details). However, Chandran et al. proved that secure PV
protocol are impossible in the classical world [1]. In view of the huge success of quantum cryptography on
its security, it is desirable to introduce quantum mechanics into PV to resolve the above problem.
Quantum position verification (QPV) was first studied by Kent under the name of “quantum tagging” as
early as 2002. In 2006 a patent of quantum tagging given by Kent et al. was granted [2]. But their idea was
not publicly announced as a paper until 2010 [3]. Just before the appearance of Ref. [3], Chandran et al. [4]
and Malaney [5] independently proposed a QPV protocol, respectively. In Ref. [3] Kent et al. pointed out
the insecurity of some primary QPV protocols, including the ones in Refs. [4, 5], and then presented two
improved protocols which can stand against their attacks. Lau and Lo studied the security of the protocols
in Refs. [4, 5] further and gave general attack strategies to them in detail. Furthermore, they proposed a
modified scheme and proved its security under the condition that the shared quantum resource between the
adversaries is a two- or three-level system [6]. However, utilizing the technology of instantaneous nonlocal
quantum computation (INQC), Buhrman et al. recently proposed the no-go theorem for QPV, where all
the previous QPV protocols were proved insecure under the condition that unlimited entanglement were
previously shared between the adversaries [7, 8]. Afterwards, the INQC attack was improved in the sense
that the amount of the required entanglement for a successful attack is reduced [9]. In addition, Buhrman et
al. defined a new model of communication complexity, the garden-hose model, which can be used to prove
upper bounds on the number of EPR pairs needed to attack QPV protocols [10].
1.2 The previous models of QPV protocols
In a QPV protocol a prover P wants to convince a set of k verifiers V0, . . . , Vk−1, who are located at different
reference stations, that he/she is at a particular spatial location. In this condition the aim of the adversaries
is to persuade the verifiers that P is working in the correct position while P has actually been removed.
The setting of the simplest QPV is the one-dimension one, where two verifiers V0 and V1 want to verify the
position of the prover P (all of them are in a straight line and P is located between V0 and V1, see Fig. 1).
Fig. 2 describes a general model of QPV, which we call standard QPV (SQPV). Till now, most protocols
were designed in this model [3, 4, 5, 6]. The only exception is the recent one give by Kent [11], where the
item R7 is removed. That is, the prover P has a secret key which helps he/she to show his/her unique identity
to the verifiers. This model, which we call keyed QPV (KQPV), is actually a compromise between the
requirements in real applications and the security against the INQC attack (generally, P is only a device and
might be obtained by the adversaries, so it is difficult to guarantee the security of the key in it). Therefore,
generally speaking, SQPV is more desirable if it can keep secure under all potential attacks.
The QPV protocols work in a challenge-response manner. That is, the verifiers send a challenge com-
mand to the prover and judge the correctness and the timeliness of his/her corresponding response. The
command might be to measure a given quantum system in a certain basis and announce the result, or to per-
form a certain operation on the quantum system and send it back to the verifiers. The command is generally
divided into several pieces and sent by different verifiers respectively. The sending times of all these pieces
are controlled so that they will arrive at the intended position simultaneously. Thus the person indeed in
this position is the first one who can obtain all the pieces, recover the complete command, and then give
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R1 All the signals including the quantum and classical ones are transmitted at light speed.
R2 The verifiers have synchronized clocks.
R3 The sizes of all the users’ devices are negligible.
R4 P has a finite secure region around him, where the adversaries have no access. (Otherwise, any one
can “personate” P by just standing at P ’s position.)
R5 All the computations, including classical computations, quantum measurements, and quantum oper-
ations, are instantaneous. That is, the times consumed by all these computations are negligible.
R6 To authenticate the prover’s position, the verifiers can cooperate with each other before and after the
communication with the prover. For example, they can previously share some secret information,
and perform some calculations or measurements together after the communication to determine the
verification result.
R7 There is no secret which is unknown for the adversaries between the verifiers and P .
Figure 2: The standard QPV model.
For each round, there are four quantum systems A, B, J , and R. P holds the system R, which is set to
some default value at the beginning. V0 keeps A, V1 keeps B, and they jointly keep J . There are also two
classical information x and y, belonging to V0 and V1 respectively. As we will see, A, B, x, and y are the
challenge signals, i.e. the pieces of the challenge command, which will be sent to P so that he/she can
recover the complete command from them.
G1 V0 sends A and x to P , and V1 sends B and y to P . The sending time is controlled so that P , the
one who is really in the intended position, will receive all of them simultaneously.
G2 According to the classical information x and y, P performs different operations or measurements
to ABR as soon as he/she received these challenge signals, and then sends the response (e.g. the
resulted systems or the measurement result) to V0 and V1, respectively.
G3 V0 and V1 jointly judge whether the response they received is correct and timely.
Figure 3: One round of the one-dimension standard QPV.
the correct response in time. While the one in other positions can only recover the command and give a
correct response in a later time (note that if he/she tries to make the response arrive at the verifiers in time
its correctness will not be assured because he/she has to send it out before all the pieces are obtained).
Generally, the challenge-response process is executed round by round. If all the responses are right and
in time in enough rounds, the verifiers will accept the prover’s position. Concretely, as defined in Ref. [7],
the process of each round in QPV protocol can be described as in Fig. 3.
1.3 The INQC attack to QPV
In Buhrman et al.’s INQC attack [7], Two adversaries E0 and E1 stand in the line between V0 and P , and V1
and P respectively, and, for simplicity, the distances between Ej (j = 0, 1) and P are equal (see Fig. 1). In
every challenge-response round, E0 and E1 can simultaneously intercept the challenge signals (A, x), sent
by V0, and (B, y), sent by V1, respectively. To successfully cheat the verifiers, they have to perform nonlocal
measurement or operation on A and B in the condition that only one mutual communication can be done
between them. The INQC attack, in which E0 and E1, using the pre-shared entanglement between them,
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perform teleportations (the classical communication in the general teleportation is not included here) round
by round, can perfectly achieve the above task the adversaries face to (see Sec.2.3 for details). Therefore,
Buhrman et al. drew the conclusion that designing QPV protocol with unconditional security is impossible
in the standard security model, where the pre-shared entanglements between the adversaries are unlimited.
Because of its significance, the no-go theorem has great influence in this field. To overcome it, Buhrman
et al. gave another security model instead of the standard one, i.e. the bounded model, which only allows
limited pre-shared entanglements between the adversaries [7]. Recently, Kent pointed out that secure QPV
can be still achieved if the prover previously shared a secret key with the verifiers [11]. To some extent,
however, the requirement of a keyed prover seems too strong. Can we find a new way to overcome the
no-go theorem without the above restrictions? This is a very important problem which helps us to know
what kind of security the quantum mechanics can really bring us.
1.4 Our results
Though giving a secure SQPV in the bounded model or a secure KQPV protocol is possible, the most
challengeable thing is still to design a secure SQPV in the standard secure model. The problem is whether
we can find some special manners to get away from the application of the INQC attack. An effective
approach to this problem is to find out the hidden assumptions in the INQC attack, which is essential for
a successful attack, and then explore new QPV protocols which are not consistent with these assumptions.
Based on this idea, we obtain the following results in this paper.
The Hidden Assumptions. By careful study on the INQC attack, we find four crucial assumptions in it.
Breaking those assumptions in designing a QPV protocol might be an effective way to overcome the INQC
attack (see Sec.3).
The Proposed QPV Protocols. We propose three types of new QPV protocols, which are not consistent
with the above hidden assumptions (see Secs.4-6). Our analysis shows that for the general adversaries, who
execute the attack operations at every common time slot or the time when they detect the arrival of the
challenge signals from the verifiers, all the proposed protocols are secure even if the adversaries are allowed
to share unlimited entanglement previously.
The Superdense INQC attack. Though it is very difficult to implement in practice, the adversaries can
adopt an improved INQC attack, i.e. the superdense INQC (SINQC) one, to successfully attack our QPV
protocols in theory. In SINQC attack, the adversaries need launch a new round of attack on the coming
qubits with extremely high frequency so that none of the possible qubits, which may be sent at random time,
will be missed. We present the particular SINQC attacks for our protocols, respectively, which are quite
different with previous INQC attack (see Secs.4-6).
The Enhanced No-Go Theorem. Based on the success of the SINQC attack to our protocols, we draw
a conclusion that secure QPV is still impossible under looser assumptions in theory, which we call the the
enhanced no-go theorem for QPV (see Sec.7).
It should be emphasized that, though our original aim, i.e. overcoming the no-go theorem in QPV, has
not been achieved at last, the enhanced no-go theorem we obtained, including the ideas of our protocols and
corresponding SINQC attacks, are new and interesting. We hope that our results will shed light in the future
study of quantum position-based cryptography.
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Figure 4: Single-photon interference in a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer. BS0 and BS1 are 50:50 Beam
Splitters.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Mach-Zehnder Interferometer and Single-photon Interference
Single-photon interference is an interesting phenomenon in the quantum world. Fig. 4 is the demonstration
of a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer. When a photon is sent to BS0 from the source S0, two localized wave
packets appear in the upper and the lower channels respectively. The state of the quantum system becomes
|Φ0〉 =
1√
2
(|10〉 + |10〉) where the two qubits represent two channels respectively, and 0 means a vacuum
state and 1 implies a photon. When the two wave packets arrive at BS1 simultaneously, interference will
happen and the photon will be detected by the detector D0 with certainty. Similarly, if the photon comes
from S1, the state after BS0 will be |Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|10〉 − |10〉) and the photon will be detected by D1 after
the interference at BS1. In this process, if one performs measurement in the channels to know which way
the photon is going through, the interference will not happen any more. That is, the which-way information
and the relative phase between the two wave packets can never be (exactly) obtained simultaneously. This is
an fundamental principle in quantum mechanics, i.e. complementarity [13]. Obviously this principle put a
special limit on the states |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉, making them quite different from general two-particle Bell states.
In fact, the application of this peculiarity in cryptography has been noticed for a long time. For, example,
Goldenberg and Vaidman used it to design a novel quantum key distribution protocol in 1995 [12].
2.2 Port-based teleportation
Port-based teleportation (PBT) was introduced by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [14, 15], and then was used to
reduce the entanglement resource required in the INQC attack by Beigi and Ko¨nig [9]. Different from the
better known teleportation scheme where Bob performs certain Pauli operations to do the correction accord-
ing to Alice’s classical information (i.e. the Bell-measurement result), PBT employs a simpler correction on
Bob’s side. That is, Bob just discard some subsystems according to Alice’s classical information.
Suppose that Alice wants to teleport a state |Ψ〉A ∈ Cd to Bob. In advance, Alice and Bob share a
resource state, which consists of N maximally entangled pairs in the state |Φ〉A′
i
B′
i
= 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉|i〉, where
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then PBT can be done as follows.
T1 Alice performs a certain POVM {Ei}Ni=1 on her systems AA′1A′2 . . . A′N ∈ (Cd)⊗N+1. And she
obtains the measurement outcome k (1 ≤ k ≤ N ) and sends it to Bob.
T2 Bob discards all the port subsystems B′i(i 6= k) except for B′k. And B′k now contains the teleported
state |Ψ〉.
5
Table 1: The notations in the INQC attack. Here j, k = 0, 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Notation What the notation denotes
Qij The challenge signal received by Ej in the i-th round (i.e. A and x, or B and y in Fig. 3).
ρij The quantum state of Qij .
Bi The pre-shared entangled systems by the adversaries used to perform PBT in the i-th round.
Bi,k The k-th subgroup of Bi used for the k-th PBT in the i-th round.
Bi,kj The subsystems of Bi,k on Ej’s side.
nij The which-port-information of the PBT Ej performed in the i-th round.
ρ(nij)
The state of the resulted multi-port system after the counterpart’s measurement in PBT. The
dimension of every port is equal to that of ρ and the state of the nij-th port is just ρ.
Note that this kind of teleportation does not inevitably succeed, and the success probability increases as N
gets larger (close to 1 for large N ).
2.3 INQC attack utilizing PBT
Because the PBT-based description of the INQC attack looks more understandable we will describe the
attack strategies to QPV in such a way throughout the paper. Note that in our description both E0 and E1
use PBT, which is different from that in Ref. [9], where E0 uses usual teleportation and E1 uses PBT.
Suppose there are totally m rounds in the QPV protocol, and each round proceeds as in Fig. 3. For
simplicity, we suppose the challenge signals are all quantum (for the classical parts x and y, the adversaries
can encode them into quantum ones in the computational basis), and the distance between E0 and P is equal
to that between E1 and P . The notations we will use in the description are listed in Table 1. In the INQC
attack [7], the adversaries perform the following operations in every round. For example, in the i-th round,
S1 When Qi0 and Qi1 simultaneously arrive at E0 and E1, respectively, E0 performs a measurement on
the systems Qi0B
i,1
0 to execute a PBT of Qi0 with the outcome ni0. And then E1 holds ρi0 at the ni0-th
port in her system Bi,11 [the state of the whole Bi,11 now is ρi0(ni0)].
S2 E1 performs a measurement on the systems Bi,11 Qi1B
i,2
1 to teleport B
i,1
1 Q
i
1, which is in the state
ρi0(n
i
0)ρ
i
1, with the outcome ni1. And then E0 holds
[ρi0(n
i
0)ρ
i
1](n
i
1) (1)
in Bi,20 .
S3 For each port in Bi,20 , E0 discards everything except the ni0-th sub-port to do the correction to the
chaos introduced by herself in the PBT she did above, obtaining the state
[ρi0ρ
i
1](n
i
1) (2)
in the reminder system. Note that now ρi0 and ρi1 have been put together in the ni1-th port at E0 (but
E0 does not know ni1 till now).
S4 For every port in the reminder system, E0 reads the classical signals (i.e. x and y) by measurements on
the corresponding subsystems, and then executes the operations according to the command (typically,
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performs measurement or unitary operations on the quantum signals according to the classical ones).
Afterwards E0 sends the measurement result, or the resulted qubits (if these qubits should be sent to
V1 according to the command) to E1.
Note that all the above operations by E0 and E1 are executed simultaneously, and they do not consume
time. At the same time, the adversaries also send the received classical signals (i.e. x and y) and the which-
port-information in their respective PBT (i.e. ni0 and ni1) to each other. Once they received all these contents,
both E0 and E1 know the correct response to the command. Till now, the difficulty the adversaries faced to
in the attack, that is, nonlocal measurement or operation on the separated quantum signals in the condition
that only one mutual communication can be done between them, has been overcome. Finally E0 and E1 then
send their responses to V0 and V1 respectively. Obviously the response will be correct and timely, and the
attack will be successful. We emphasize that the above description of the INQC attack is a general version,
where some transmissions (e.g. x, y, and ni0) or teleportations (e.g. x) are actually unnecessary for the QPV
protocols considered here.
3 The hidden assumptions in the INQC attack
By careful observation We find the following four hidden assumptions in the INQC attack.
H1 The quantum parts of the challenge signals consist of normal qubits in the previous QPV protocols,
which can be teleported by the adversaries without any disturbance on their states.
Analysis. If the verifiers use wave packets divided from one photon instead of normal qubits as the
quantum signals, and require the prover to observe their interference (like GV95 protocol [12]), what
will happen? Can the wave packets be teleported by the adversaries? If it can be done, whether the
measurements in teleportation, which generally means the discovery about which way the photon
is passing through, would disturb the interference? Note that the complementarity principle forbids
simultaneously observing the which-way information and the interference in this situation [13].
H2 The adversaries are aware of when to launch a new round of attack operations in the INQC attack.
Analysis. Generally speaking, the adversaries launch a new round of attack operations when a new
pair of challenge signals is coming. If the challenge signals are sent at fixed time slots, the adversaries
can perform the teleportation at the fixed time points when the challenge signals would arrive at their
positions. Alternatively, if normal qubits are employed, the adversaries can begin their teleportation
of the challenge signals when they detect the qubits. However, if the verifiers send the challenge
signals at random time instead of the fixed time slots, and use wave packets instead of normal qubits
in them (so that the adversaries cannot know their coming because discovering the coming of any
wave packet means the detection of the photon, which will inevitably disturb the interference), both
the above conditions are unsatisfied. Then what will happen?
H3 The different rounds of the protocol are independent with each other.
Analysis. QPV protocol can be designed so that the prover’s result Rp in the previous round is also
a piece of command in the present round. But it is trivial to break down this assumption separately
because it is just equivalent to that when combining the challenge signals in the adjacent two rounds
as the command of the present round. In fact, Buhrman et al. also considered this situation in Ref.
[7]. However, as we will show in Secs.5-6, combining it with other manners (i.e. breaking down other
assumptions) is a possible way to overcome the INQC attack. So we still list this assumption here.
7
H4 The adversaries are aware of which challenge signals are matched signals. Here “matched” signals
means the ones that compose a complete command and will be operated collectively by the prover.
For example, in Fig. 3 (A, x) and (B, y) are a pair of matched signals.
Analysis. As we know, both the QPV protocol and the INQC attack are executed round by round,
and the separate adversaries need to use the same group of the shared entangled states to deal with the
matched signals [for example, in the INQC attack in Sec.2.3, both E0 and E1 use Bi to teleport their
respective (matched) signals Qi0 and Qi1]. Therefore, if the adversaries do not know which signals
are matched ones, they might use different group of entangled states to deal with a pair of matched
signals, which obviously will result in the failure of the INQC attack.
In fact, recognizing the matched signals is a quite simple task so that it is always overlooked in the
study. Generally, as in all the previous QPV protocols, the matched signals will be sent in fixed time
slots by V0 and V1 and reach P simultaneously. In this condition E0 and E1 knows that the signals
they received in the same time slot are matched ones. Even though the signals are sent at random time,
as discussed in H2, E0 and E1 still knows that the signals they received in the same order are matched
ones. However, if we make some of the matched signals encounter at other positions (e.g. P ′) instead
of P (note that it does not damage the security of QPV when P ′ is also in P ’s secure region), the
signals received in the same time slot by E0 and E1 might not matched ones anymore. Alternatively,
V0 and V1 can also insert some decoy signals in the ordinary ones so that the signals received by E0
and E1 in the same order are not matched. So, if we do such modifications in the QPV protocols, can
INQC attack still work?
As is analyzed above, the key to overcome the no-go theorem for QPV is to break down these hidden
assumptions. Based on this idea, we will present QPV protocols which are not consistent with them, and
then analyze their security in detail.
4 Protocol I: Attempts to break down H1 and H2
Based on the analyses about H1 and H2, we present a QPV protocol (called Protocol I) based on single-
photon interference and random sending time, which breaks down the two assumptions simultaneously.
Protocol I proceeds as follows (See Fig. 5).
I1 V0 sends single photons into the interferometer, at random time, from S0 or S1 with equal probability.
V0 records the sending time of every photon.
I2 To ensure the security of the transmission in the lower channel, V0 and V1 can measure the wave-
packet pairs, which are generated at BS0 in some random (can also be predetermined) time periods,
and judge whether there are one and only one photon for each pair.
Note. Generally, how to secretly share the wave-packet pairs between V0 and V1 is not the focus in
the QPV protocol, and consequently Steps I1 and I2 can be omitted here (see R6 in Fig. 2). However,
to represent the protocol clearly, we still list them here and in Fig. 5.
I3 The other wave-packet pairs (which are not measured by V0 and V1) will appear at P ’s detectors D0
or D1 via interference. Once P received a photon, he broadcasts the value (i.e. which detector the
photon appear at) to V0 and V1 right now.
I4 V0 and V1 record the receiving time of P ’s response and the value in it. After sending enough photons,
V0 and V1 authenticate the position of P according to the receiving times and the values. If the
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Figure 5: Protocol I. The dotted rectangle implies the user’s lab, where no adversaries can enter. The circles
in V0’s lab are the storage rings with length LR. The interferometer is a balanced one, that is, the lengths
satisfy LY + LR + L0 = L0 + L1 + LY + L1.
responses for all photons are in time and correct (and no eavesdropping is detected in step I2), they
believe P ’s position. Otherwise, the position does not pass the authentication.
Now we consider the possible problems, as analyzed in H1 and H2, that might appear in the INQC attack
to such a QPV protocol.
Problems in H1. Can the wave packets be teleported? If it can be done, whether the measurements in
the adversaries’ teleportation, which generally means the discovery about which way the photon is passing
through (that is, the measurement result of any adversary inevitably implies the number of the coming
photons, i.e. 0 or 1), would disturb the interference, and consequently they can never obtain the correct
response?
Successful teleportation is an essential requirement of the INQC attack. Because there might be no
photon in a wave packet at all, can it be teleported? If the answer is negative, the INQC attack will be
useless to Protocol I. However, in fact, the adversaries can change the wave-packet state |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉 into
a general two-qubit entangled state in theory [16], and consequently the state can be teleported and such
teleportation need not reveal the which-way information about the photon. Therefore, it is unnecessary to
worry about the above two problems when the adversaries execute the INQC attack to Protocol I.
Problem in H2. Can the adversaries be aware of when to launch a new round of attack operations in the
INQC attack?
Obviously the using of single-photon interference and random sending time will bring new difficulty for
the adversaries in INQC attack. On the one hand, the challenge signals (wave packets) are sent at random
time points instead of fixed time slots, the adversaries cannot perform the teleportation at the fixed time
points when the challenge signals would arrive at their positions. On the other hand, the way that using the
detection of a signal’s coming to give rise to a new round of attack is not feasible, either. If the adversaries
want to judge whether a photon is coming, according to the complementarity principle, their observation
will expose the which-way information and then result in that no interference will happen later. (In fact,
there is only one photon for each pair of wave packets in the two channels, so it is impossible for any pair
to tell both E0 and E1 to begin a new attack round.) As a result, in the INQC attack to Protocol I, the
adversaries will not recognize when to launch a new round of attack operations as before.
It should be emphasized that the prover P need not know the time when the pair of wave packets will
arrive at his/her position. This is because the two packets will reach P simultaneously and then be detected
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by D0 or D1. That is, D0 or D1 will be triggered automatically once the packets arrived. But for the
adversaries E0 and E1, things are different. They have to know the coming of a wave packet so that they can
launch the teleportation. One may ask a question as follows. Is it possible that the adversaries put a device
(including qubits from the shared entangled states), waiting the coming of the signal to do the measurement
for teleportation of it also in an automatical way? The answer is negative. Obviously, there are the following
two conditions about this measurement.
• The measurement is triggered by the coming photon. That is, if there is no signal coming, the mea-
surement will not be performed. In this condition, once the measurement device clicked, E1 knows
that there is a photon, that is, she knows the which-way information, so, she will not obtain the correct
relative phase and consequently their attack will fail.
• The measurement is NOT triggered by the coming photon. Then, to catch every signal passing
through, E0 and E1 have to perform the attack continually for any time (no matter whether there
is a signal in the channel at that time).
Now we can draw a conclusion about the security of Protocol I. On the positive side, it is secure against
INQC attack for the general adversaries, who execute the attack operations at every common time slot or
the time when they detect the arrival of the challenge signals from the verifiers. This implies practically
secure QPV can be obtained even if the adversaries is allowed to share unlimited entanglement previously.
Here by “practically” we mean that an successful attack exists only in theory because the adversaries have
to perform superdense INQC (SINQC), that is, to launch a new round of attack on the coming qubits with
extremely high frequency so that none of the possible qubits, which may be sent at random time, will be
missed. As a interesting result, by using single-photon interference and random sending time (i.e. breaking
down H1 and H2), the adversaries in INQC attack are forced to be blind. This additional difficulty for a
successful attack just like that a blind man, who stands beside a fiber where photons will pass by at random
time, tries to “cut” the fiber by a knife continually so that he can “catch” all the possible photons.
On the other side, though it is very difficult to achieve in practice the adversaries can still attack the
proposed protocol successfully by SINQC. So Protocol I is still insecure in theory. Nevertheless, except for
the difficulty discussed above, the adversaries need much more shared entanglement in such attack because
most consumed entangled states are wasted (used on the signals which do not exist at all).
5 Protocol II: Attempts to break down H3 and H4
In this section, we mainly consider to shatter the hidden assumptions H4, and when needed, the breach of
H3 will be also considered together. As discussed in H4, one prerequisite for the INQC attack is that the
adversaries are aware of which pair of signals are matched. If the matched challenge signals are arranged that
they arrive at P at different times, the separated adversaries will not know which signals are matched ones,
and might use different group of entangled states to deal with a pair of matched signals, which obviously will
result in the failure of the INQC attack. For simplicity, we call this kind of protocols Different-Time QPV
(DTQPV), which is quite different from the previous protocols. Here we should emphasize that, though in
DTQPV the matched signals are not simultaneously arrive at the position of P any more, the protocol can
be still secure like that in the previous QPV protocols. For example, it can be designed that to receive the
complete matched signals the person at any position out of the secure region of P will be later than P ).
As we know, if the every pair of matched signals are sent from V0 and V1 independently in turn, E0
and E1 can still execute INQC attack according to the order of the signals she received even though the two
matched signals arrive at P at different times. That is, as discussed in H2 and H4, E0 and E1 still knows that
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the signals they received in the same order are matched ones. Therefore, there generally are some additional
manners to protect the protocol against the above attack by E0 and E1 in DTQPV. For example, V0 and V1
can also insert some decoy signals in the ordinary ones so that the signals received by E0 and E1 in the same
order are not matched. We need not worry about how P distinguishes the decoy signals and discards them
because this information can be obtained from the measurement result on the previous matched signals [e.g.
the measurement result 0 (1) means the next signal from V0 (V1) is a decoy one and should be overlooked].
Obviously in this condition the assumption H3 is also broken down.
In the following we will present two kinds of DTQPV protocols and discuss their security in detail.
5.1 The public-order DTQPV protocol
Though DTQPV looks like an effective model to stand against the INQC attack, designing secure DTQPV
protocols (with normal qubits) is challenging. Here we introduce a special kind of DTQPV protocol, i.e.
the so-called public-order DTQPV, where the chronological order for all the challenge signals (from both
sides) arriving at P is known by both P and the adversaries. As we will show, this kind of protocol are still
insecure for general INQC attack. But we need talk about it (especially the corresponding attack) in detail
because the attack strategy is a basis for the analysis of a general DTQPV which will be given in the next
subsection.
Since the challenge signals reach P in a public order, we can label all of them according to the chrono-
logical order of their arrivals at P under the following rules. (1) If there come two signals from two sides of
P simultaneously, the challenge signal from V0 should be labeled anterior to the one from V1. (2) If there
come two adjacent signals from one side, which means that no signal comes from the other side between
them, a special signal from the other side, denoted as an “empty signal”, is added factitiously between them
(note that this is can be achieved because the adversaries is assumed to know the order of the challenge
signals here). And the added empty signal is assumed to reach P at the same time with the anterior one. (3)
Assume that the first signal is from V0, otherwise, add an empty signal from V0 before the real first one. In
this way, all the challenge signals can be listed according to the chronological order as follows.
Q10Q
2
1Q
3
0Q
4
1 . . . Q
n−1
0 Q
n
1 (3)
Here, the subscript 0 represents the challenge signal is from V0, correspondingly 1 represents the challenge
signal is from V1, and the superscripts represent the challenge signal’s order. Obviously, following the three
rules above, the challenge signals, including the empty ones, arrive at P from V0 and V1 alternately one by
one now. Here we do not limit that only the adjacent two signals can compose the matched ones. Maybe
(Q10, Q30), (Q10, Q41), or even (Q10, Q30, Q41) are matched signals as long as such a protocol is still secure
like that in the previous QPV protocols (e.g, to receive the complete matched signals the person at any
position out of the secure region of P will be later than P ). This can be taken as the general model of the
public-order DTQPV. Note that the (quantum) signals involved here is normal qubits, which can be detected
without disturbing their states.
Now we will introduce our proposed attack to this kind of protocols. For simplicity, we suppose the
challenge signal Qij is all quantum and in the state ρi, where j = 0, 1 (for the classical parts, the adversaries
can encode it into quantum ones). To describe it clearly, we first list the notations that we will use in the
following description of the attack strategy in Table 2. In this attack (Attack I), Ej performs the following
operation Ai when the challenge signal Qij arrives.
A1 When Q10 arrives, E0 performs a measurement on the systems Q10B10 to execute a PBT of Q10 with the
outcome n10. And then E1 holds ρ1 at the n10-th port in system B11 [the state of the whole B11 now is
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Table 2: The notations in the description of Attack I. Here, j = 0, 1 and i = 1, . . . , n.
Notation What the notation denotes
Bi The pre-shared entangled systems Ej used to perform the teleportation when Qij arrives.
Bij The subsystems of Bi on Ej’s side.
nij The which-port-information of the teleportation Ej performed when Qij arrives.
ρ(nij)
The state of the resulted multi-port system after the counterpart’s measurement in PBT. The
dimension of every port is equal to that of ρ and the state of the nij-th port is just ρ.
Gi
The operation that the adversaries should do on the quantum part according to the classical part
in one port, when he receives Qij , including measurements, unitary operations or nothing.
Li
The information (for all the ports) that should be sent to the counterpart after Gi, e.g. the
measurement results or the operated qubits which should be sent to the verifier at the other side.
Rij The remainder system of the previous steps at Ej when Qij arrives (see the attack for details).
ρ1(n10)]. We suppose that E1 has performed the next teleportation utilizing B2 (this teleportation will
be done when Q21 comes to E1, and it will be really executed in Step A2). And E0 now holds
[ρ1(n10)ρ
2](n21) (4)
in B20 . The above supposition is reasonable since the measurement results to the local systems are
independent with the measurement order. Simultaneously, for each port in B20 , E0 first discards
everything except the n10-th sub-port to do the correction to the chaos introduced by herself and the
state changes to
[ρ1ρ2](n21). (5)
And then E0 performs the operation G2 (i.e. the operation or measurement she should do according
to the classical part of the signals, nothing should be done if ρ1 and ρ2 are not matched) on all the
ports respectively. Afterwards, E0 sends the necessary information L2 (i.e. the measurement results
or the necessary operated qubits in all ports) to E1. Now the remainder system is R30 and its state
is denoted as [ρ1ρ2](n21), where the overline represents the system has been operated. Note that the
qubits which was measured in G2 are still in R30, and the qubits which was sent to the other adversary
(i.e. included in L2) are replaced by the ones in certain predetermined states (e.g. |0〉 for every qubit).
So the dimension and the port structure of [ρ1ρ2](n21) are the same as that of [ρ1ρ2](n21).
A2 When Q21 arrives, E1 performs a measurement on the systems R21Q21B21 to teleport R21Q21 which is in
state ρ1(n10)ρ
2 with the outcome n21. And then E0 holds
[ρ1(n10)ρ
2](n21) (6)
in B20 . As in A1, suppose E0 has performed the next teleportation (which should be really done when
Q30 arrives E0 in Step A3) and E1 holds
[[ρ1ρ2](n21)ρ3](n30) (7)
in B31 . For each port in B31 , E1 only reserves the n21-th sub-port and performs G3 on it. Afterwards,
E1 sends the measurement results and the necessary operated qubits L3 to E0. Now the remainder
system is R41 and its state is denoted as [ρ1ρ2ρ3](n30).
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Ai(3 ≤ i ≤ n) Ej performs a measurement on the systems RijQijBij to execute a PBT of RijQij with a outcome nij .
And then Ej′ holds
[[ρ0ρ1 . . . ρi−1](ni−1j′ )ρi](nij) (8)
in system Bij′ , where j′ = j ⊕ 1. Suppose that Ej′ has finished the next teleportation and Ej holds
[[ρ0ρ1 . . . ρi](nij)ρi+1](ni+1j′ ) (9)
in Bi+1j . For each port in B
i+1
j , Ej first discards everything except the nij-th sub-port to do the
correction to the chaos introduced by herself in the teleportation she did above, then performs the
operation Gi+1 on all the ports respectively. Afterwards, Ej sends the measurement results and the
necessary operated qubits Li+1 to Ej′ . Now the remainder system is Ri+2j and its state is denoted as
[ρ1ρ2 . . . ρi+1](ni+1j′ ).
In this attack, the adversaries send the classical signal from the verifiers and the which-port-information
in their respective PBT (i.e. nij) to each other once they were obtained. At the same time, the adversaries
also send the response to their closer verifiers respectively once they recognized what is the correct response.
It is not difficult to see that the correct and timely. Concretely, suppose that Qij will reach P at time ti, the
distance between E0 (E1) and P is L, and ∆T = L/c (c is the speed of light). When Q21 reaches E1 at time
t2−∆T , the which-port-information n21 is generated and sent to E0, which will reach E0 at t2+∆T . Before
this, at t1−∆T , the possible results L2 are generated and sent to E1, which will reach E1 at t1+∆T . Once
E0 (E1) gains both n21 and L2, she can deduce the correct response information. According to the arriving
times of n21 at E0 and L2 at E1 (both ≤ t2 + ∆T ), the responses are also in time. And this situation also
holds for any later signal Qij . Consequently, the attack strategy is successful.
Similar to that in the INQC attack in Sec.2.3, the above description of the attack is a general version,
where some transmissions (e.g. some classical signals and nij) or teleportations (e.g. the anterior qubits in
Rij which do not take any effect to the present operation) might be unnecessary when particular protocol is
considered.
5.2 The private-order DTQPV protocols
In the above subsection, we proved the public-order DTQPV protocols are insecure. Consequently, QPV
protocols has to be designed in the private-order model to pursue higher security. It is not difficult to see
that the attack in the last subsection (i.e. Attack I) will fail if the order of the signals is unknown to E0 and
E1 because the adversaries will not know when they need add an empty signal so that all the signals come
to P one-side by one-side [just like that in Eq. (3)].
In fact, the private-order DTQPV protocol can be designed in different ways. For example, the manner
of adding decoy signals, as discussed above, is one kind of private-order DTQPV protocols. Note that in
such protocols E0 and E1 never know which side the next decoy signal will come from, which implies that
the order of all signals is unknown to them. Here we give another kind of private-order DTQPV protocols,
where the matching information is encoded into the chronological order of the challenge signals’ arrivals at
P and no decoy signals are added. This kind of protocols are easier to analyze, and the conclusions about
their security can be generalize to general DTQPV protocols. One example (called Protocol II) of these
protocols is as follows.
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II1 In advance, V0 and V1 prepare a list of states |ϕk〉ij under an orthogonal basis, where i, j = 0, 1,
k = 1, 2, . . . m and 〈ϕk|ϕk′〉 = δkk′ (i.e. mutually orthogonal with each other). Each state is divided
into two subsystems, which will be sent to P so that P can measure them in the corresponding basis
and then announce the result to the verifiers. If the subscripts ij = 00 (ij = 11), both subsystems in
this state are stored in V0’s (V1’s) position. And if ij = 01 or ij = 10, each of the verifiers holds one
of the two subsystems. What’s more, the states are designed in such a way that each subsystem are
in the same mixed state individually, just like the EPR pairs, thus only collective measurements can
extract the information encoded in them correctly.
II2 When the protocol begins, V0 and V1 send every subsystems (one by one) to P at random times but in
such a way that the two subsystems of the same state arriving at P adjacently, i.e. no other subsystems
arrive at P between them.
II3 Whenever P receives two new subsystems, he measures them in the bases {|ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, . . . , |ϕm〉} and
sends the measurement result to both V0 and V1 immediately.
II4 V0 and V1 jointly accept P ’s position if and only if they received all of P ’s response results correctly
and in time.
Since the order of the challenge signals in Protocol II are unknown to the adversaries, they cannot know
how to insert the “empty signals”. Consequently, they cannot normalize the challenge signals in the form of
Eq. (3), which will cause the situation that each adversary is unaware of the order of the signal which she is
teleporting in the whole signal sequence. And through a concrete analysis, we find if the adversaries follows
the steps A1 to An in Attack I to attack Protocol II, but without a chronological order of all the signals as in
Eq. (3), they cannot make the response information reach V0 and V1 in time.
In fact, Protocol II is secure against all the attack model where the adversaries perform the attack
operations only when they detect the arrival of the challenge signals. To prove this, we consider the first
two signals sent by E0, denoted as Q10 and Q20, and the first two sent by E1, denoted as Q11 and Q21. There are
three possible operations that P will perform: measuring Q10Q20, measuring Q10Q11, and measuring Q11Q21.
The correct choice is encoded by the time of these signals’ arrivals at P . If the adversaries want to measure
them correctly, they must compare their arrival time. However, the challenge signal’s arrival time can only be
known to the adversaries when it indeed reaches E0 or E1. To consider the four signals as a whole, E0 (E1)
can deduce the correct order information no sooner than E1’s (E0’s) classical information for teleporting
Q21 (Q20) arrives at E0 (E1). And only then, they can deduce the correct response information. So due to
the limitation of the no signaling theorem, the responses will be late doubtlessly. The similar problems will
also hold in the following processes. So Protocol II is secure against the adversaries who perform the attack
operations only when they detect the arrival of the challenge signals. Considering the strategy of sending
signals at random time is employed, we get the conclusion that Protocol II is secure against INQC attack for
the general adversaries, who execute the attack operations at every common time slot or the time when they
detect the arrival of the challenge signals from the verifiers, just like Protocol I.
As an instance of private-order QPV, Protocol II has been proved secure against the general adversaries.
However, facing the same problem with Protocol I, this type of QPV is also insecure against the SINQC
attack. Actually, through adding the “empty signals” with extremely high frequency during the whole pro-
cess of the protocol, the adversaries with strong ability can still list the challenge signals in the form of Eq.
(3). That is to say, through the strategy above, adversaries can transform any private-order QPV protocol
into a public-order one and then attack it as a public-order one successfully utilizing (the superdense version
of) Attack I. And we denote this improved vision of Attack I as Attack II. Obviously, as private-order QPV
protocols, both Protocol II and the protocols utilizing decoy signals are insecure against Attack II.
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Figure 6: Protocol III: the two-point QPV employing single-photon interference and random sending time.
In a word, to analyze the situation of breaking down H3 and H4, we find an interesting fact that there
exist normal-qubit-based QPV protocols with the same security level of (wave-packet-based) Protocol I, that
is, the adversaries have to perform SINQC to attack successfully. Considering the difficulty of realizing the
single-photon interference for long distance, private-order DTQPV protocols, such as Protocol II and the
protocols utilizing decoy signals, are more practical.
6 Protocol III: Attempt to break down all the four hidden assumptions
Now we will continue to consider the situation of breaking all of the hidden assumptions. To make the
matching information unclear to the adversaries in the QPV protocol employing single-photon interference,
we can set up more than one interference points in the secure area of P . Let us take the two-point one as an
example (See Fig. 6), where the two interference points are labeled as P0 and P1. The wave packets on the
two sides may simultaneously arrive at either P0 or P1. During the protocol which interference point works
in the current round is determined by the measurement results of the previous rounds. For example, if the
measurement result of the last round is 0 (1), P0 (P1) will work in the current round. Thus, the matching
information is uncharted for the adversaries and the attack strategy to Protocol I will fail here.
We call the QPV protocols with two or more proving points as multi-point QPV. In this kind of protocols,
there is one receiving device at every proving point, and all of them are controlled (on or off) by the prover
P . Generally the distance between different proving points is very short and the protocol can be easily
realized. This modification does not damage the security of the protocol when P0 and P1 are both in the
secure region around P . Note that there are difference between the multi-point strategy and the private-order
DTQPV. The challenge signals are never delayed (i.e. stored by P waiting its matched signal) in the former
while some of the challenge signals have to be delayed in the latter, which means the prover should store
a part of the signals before operations on them. Consequently, Attack II is likely to be ineffective for the
multi-point protocols. In fact, if the adversaries employ Attack II to attack the multi-point QPV protocols,
by a detailed analysis we find that the response information will be delayed definitely when the interference
point is supposed to be changed.
Obviously, the multi-point QPV with single-photon interference and random sending time is an im-
proved version of Protocols I and II, so it might be more difficult to attack. However, it is still insecure
against the special attack strategy (i.e. SINQC) in theory though the attack becomes more complex. Next,
we will take the two-point one (denoted as Protocol III) as our example to present the particular attack
strategy (denoted as Attack III) in detail.
Without loss of generality, suppose the scheme begin with a pair of matched challenge signals (i.e. the
packets divided from a photon) which are sent by V0 and V1 so that they will arrive at P1 simultaneously,
and the time when E0 and E1 received their first matched challenge signals is t0 (suppose the positions of
E0 and E1 are symmetrical with respect to P1). For the sake of clarity, we list the notations that we will use
in the following description in Table 3. And for simplicity, the following description omits the transmission
of classical information. In fact, the adversaries send all the necessary classical information to each other,
including the which-port-information generated in the teleportation and the Bell-measurement results (i.e.
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Table 3: The notations in the description of Attack III. Here, ti = t0 + i∆t and j = 0, 1.
Notation What the notation denotes
L The distance between P0 and P1.
∆t
The maximum time interval for the adversaries to perform attacks to ensure no wave
packets are missed (i.e. SINQC attack), which is ultra short.
Qtij
The quantum signal Ej receives at ti (suppose it has been transformed into normal qubit
from the wave packet [16]). For simplicity, it also means the state of this signal.
Ctij
The Bell-measurement results obtained in the previous rounds on Ej’s side at ti (actually
the part which has been received by the counterpart can be excluded). For simplicity, it also
means the quantum state carrying these results.
Bti
The pre-shared entangled systems E0 uses at ti (E1 will use a part of them before ti). Note
that the entangled states are enough and every PBT via them consumes different part of them.
ntij The which-port-information of the teleportation Ej performed at ti.
Q(ntij )
The resulted multi-port system after the counterpart’s measurement in the PBT. The
dimensionality of every port is equal to that of Q and the state of the ntij -th port is just Q.
the interference results) on the teleported systems. The detailed process of Attack III is as follows.
III1 At t0, E0 teleports the received signal Qt00 to E1 through the entangled system Bt0 with the outcome
nt00 . Thus E1 obtains Q
t0
0 (n
t0
0 ). Then E1 teleports it back (via the entanglement in Bt0) to E0 together
with the signal she received Qt01 , with the outcome n
t0
1 . Then E0 clears away the redundant systems
according to nt00 and obtains [Q
t0
0 , Q
t0
1 ](n
t0
1 ). E0 measures each port of it and gets the measurement
results.
III2 For the period from t0 to tL = t0 + 2L/c, the adversaries perform the following operations at regular
intervals ∆t, i.e. at every ti = t0 + i∆t, where i = 0, 1, ..., 2Lc∆t .
(III2.1) E0 teleports Qti0 to E1 through Bti and then the latter gets Qti0 (nti0 ). (If no wave packet
arrives, Qti0 is in state |0〉, which is the original state of the normal qubit when we want to transform
a wave-packet state into a normal-qubit one [16].)
(III2.2) E1 teleports Qti0 (nti0 ) back to E0 (via the entangled states in Bti) together with Qti1 and the
classical information obtained in the previous rounds Cti1 . E0 obtains [Q
ti
0 (n
ti
0 ), Q
ti
1 , C
ti
1 ](n
ti
1 ) and
then clears away nti0 and obtains [Q
ti
0 , Q
ti
1 , C
ti
1 ](n
ti
1 ).
(III2.3) For each port, E0 first measures the classical information Cti1 . Combining with her own Cti0 ,
E0 can deduce whether the two signals are matched. For the ports in which the signals are matched,
E0 measures them in Bell bases; and for the ports in which the signals are not matched, she retains
them.
Note. The unmatched situation is relatively intricate. It implies the wave packets will reach P0
simultaneously. So no wave packet arrives at E0 currently (otherwise E1 should receive its matched
packet before t0, which contradicts with the postulate that the protocol begins at t0). Consequently,
Qti1 should be matched with Q
ti+
0 , where ti+ = ti + 2L/c. Generally, they should wait until E0
receive Qti+0 and measure Q
ti+
0 and Q
ti
1 in Bell bases. The concrete operations are: (a) E0 teleports
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Q
ti+
0 , C
ti
0 and Q
ti
1 (n
ti
1 ) to E1 through Bti+ ; (b) E1 clears away nti1 and gets [Qti+0 , Qti1 , Cti0 ](nti+0 )
at the corresponding system of Bti+ ; (c) for each port, E1 first measures Cti0 and gets the matching
information combining with Cti1 , and then she measures Q
ti+
0 and Q
ti
1 in the unmatched port in Bell
basis (the matched port will be overlooked now, which implies Qti0 and Qti1 are matched and was
already measured by E0 at ti). However, if the adversaries execute the above operations until ti+,
the response to V0 would be delayed by 2L/c. How to avoid this? As we know, the probability
distributions of the measurement results is independent with the measurement order. Consequently,
operation (a) has to be executed until ti+, while (b) and (c) do not. So E1 can execute (b) and (c) at ti
before (a) has finished.
(III2.4) E1 images that she has obtained the state
[Q
ti+
0 , Q
ti
1 (n
ti
1 ), C
ti
0 ](n
ti+
0 ), (10)
which is teleported from E0, in Bti+ , and does the corrections and measurements to the system as
described in (b) and (c) above.
III3 For the period after tL (until the end), the adversaries perform the following operations at every
ti = tL + k∆t, where i = (2L)/(c∆t) + k and k > 0.
(III3.1) E0 teleports the signal currently received by her Qti0 , the reserved Qti−1 (nti−1 ) at ti− = ti −
2L/c, and the previous classical information Cti−0 to E1 through Bti . This is coincident with the
operation (a) above.
(III3.2)-(III3.4) are the same as (III2.2)-(III2.4), respectively.
In this attack, the adversaries send the response to their closer verifiers respectively once they recognized
what is the correct response. Similar to Attack I, the adversaries’ response will be correct and timely, and
so this attack will be successful.
Here Protocol III, i.e. the two-point QPV protocol employing single-photon interference and random
sending time, can be modified to multi-point ones. However, Attack III can also be easily extended to
the corresponding versions which can successfully attack such protocols. And it is worth noting that this
strategy, i.e. the multi-point strategy, can also be used to modify the private-order DTQPV protocols and
such protocols would still be insecure against the corresponding attacks which would be the combinations of
Attack II and Attack III. We will not describe such protocols and attacks in detail since they are just simple
extensions and combinations.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we attempted to overcome a crucial obstacle in the study of pursuing secure QPV, i.e. the no-
go theorem proposed by Buhrman et al. [7]. By analyzing four implicit and essential hidden assumptions
for a successful INQC attack, we proposed three kinds of protocols which are not consistent with these
assumptions. Our results show that for the general adversaries, who execute the attack operations at every
common time slot or the time when they detect the arrival of the challenge signals from the verifiers, our
proposed protocols are secure even if unlimited pre-shared entanglement is allowed to the verifiers (i.e. the
standard secure model).
However, as we demonstrated, these protocols are still insecure in theory because they are vulnerable
to the SINQC attack, where the adversaries have to launch a new round of attack on the coming qubits
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with extremely high frequency so that none of the possible qubits, which was sent at random times, will
be missed. In spite of this, our proposed protocols still achieve practically security because of the high
difficulty of realizing the SINQC attack. Furthermore, since most of the entanglement resource pre-shared
by the adversaries are wasted to teleport the “empty signals”, including the state |0〉 when no wave packet
arrives in the protocols with single-photon interference (e.g, protocols I and III) and the added empty signals
in private-order DTQPV (e.g. protocol II), the adversaries need much more entanglement to execute a
successful attack to our protocols than the previous ones. It implies our protocols also exhibits higher
security when the amount of the shared entanglement among the adversaries is bounded (i.e. the bounded
secure model).
By proposing the three kinds of new QPV protocols and the corresponding SINQC attack strategies, we
have actually proven the impossibility of secure QPV with looser assumptions, which means the breach of
the four hidden assumptions H1-H4. On this basis, we propose the enhanced no-go theorem for QPV.
The enhanced no-go theorem for QPV. Besides the previous ones [3, 4, 5, 6], QPV protocols employ-
ing the following strategies are still insecure in theory, that is, all of them are still vulnerable to the SINQC
attack. (1) The strategy of employing wave packets of the single-photon interference and random sending
time, such as Protocol I; (2) The strategy that the arrival times at P of the matched signals are different, such
as the private-order DTQPV (i.e. protocol II); (3) The strategy of setting up more than one proving points
where the matched signals should arrive simultaneously, i.e. the multi-point QPV; (4) The combining of the
above three strategies, such as the protocols designed by combining the breach of H1 and H3 (Protocol III),
and the protocols designed by combining the breach of H2 and H3.
Note that in this paper we used one dimension QPV as our example to demonstrate the protocols and
the attacks. In fact the conclusions can also be generalized into the multi-dimension QPV protocols.
At last, we would like to list some other conclusions about QPV.
• The results of local measurements to different systems are independent with the order of the measure-
ments. This property plays an crucial role in designing our proposed attack strategies and should be
paid attention to in the analysis of QPV.
• By using single-photon interference and random sending time (i.e. breaking down H1 and H2), the
adversaries in INQC attack is forced to be blind. That is to say, they have to employ SINQC to perform
a successful attack, and the difficulty for SINQC is just like that a blind man, who stands beside a fiber
where photons will pass by at random time, tries to “cut” the fiber by a knife continually so that he
can “catch” all the possible photons. And this is a new level of security for QPV.
• It is not difficult to understand that the adversaries have to perform SINQC to attack the protocols
with single-photon interference (e.g. Protocol I) since the adversaries cannot be aware of the arrival
of the signal (otherwise the interference would be damaged). But it is interesting that protocols em-
ploying normal qubits can also reach this level of security (that is, can only be successfully attacked
by SINQC), such as the private-order DTQPV, which does not add any additional difficulty in the
realization compared with the previous QPV protocols).
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